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FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS: A BRIEF
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
MICHAEL HEISE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although few dispute the appellate process‘s centrality to justice systems, 1
especially in the criminal context, 2 debates over rationales supporting the
appellate process‘s vaunted status in adjudication systems persist. Clearly, it
is difficult to overestimate error correction as a justification for an appellate
system. Of course, other rationales, such as a desire for lawmaking 3 and
legitimacy, 4 also support the inclusion of a mechanism for appellate review in
an adjudication system.
Though comparative latecomers, appellate courts are now ubiquitous in
the American legal landscape—appellate review exists in state5 and federal6
systems for criminal convictions. Despite general agreement and widespread
understanding that access to appellate review is a critical component of a
comprehensive judicial system, the outcomes of appellate courts and, equally
important, how to interpret the outcomes, are comparatively less well
understood and developed in the research literature. In particular, the
distribution of appeals outcomes as well as explanations for the distribution
warrant additional scholarly attention.
To address this scholarly gap, this Article assesses federal criminal
appeals from an empirical perspective. Modest in ambition and scope, this
Article seeks only to map the broad empirical contours of federal criminal
appellate activity in the United States. The initial research question focuses
* Professor, Cornell Law School. Mark Chutkow, Matthew C. Heise, and Mian R. Wang,
along with participants in the Marquette University Law School Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and
Future Conference, provided helpful comments on a prior version of this Article. Cornell Law
School reference librarians provided invaluable research assistance.
1. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379, 379 (1995).
2. See generally Harold W. Elder, Trials and Settlements in the Criminal Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Dispositions and Sentencing, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1989) (analyzing settlements only
within the criminal context).
3. Shavell, supra note 1, at 381.
4. See Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 629, 636 (1980).
5. See Betsy Dee Sanders Parker, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”): Understanding the Failures of State Opt-In Mechanisms, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1975–
76 (2007) (noting how states provide for criminal appeals).
6. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (general appeal of right), § 2106 (appeal of sentence).
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on the basic results of appellate reviews of federal criminal cases. Existing
data germane to this question, while far short of thorough and definitive,
provide some helpful guidelines and trends. The second research question—
what one can responsibly infer from the results—is far more complicated and
illusive and, therefore, limited. Important limitations to existing data, as well
as the influence of selection effects, contribute to the second research
question‘s complexity and illusiveness. While existing data sketch out the
general contours of what our federal appellate courts are doing in the criminal
setting, how to interpret these data remains unclear.
II. DATA
The U.S. Sentencing Commission annually gathers and reports criminal
appeals data. Available cross-sectional data used in this study include
information on 10,052 appeals resolved in fiscal year 2006.7 Of these 10,052
appeals, disposition information was gathered for those defendants appealing
their sentence or sentence and conviction. The 1,625 appeals seeking only to
overturn a conviction on appeal were excluded from the Sentencing
Commission‘s data. Of the 8,427 remaining appeals, 144 were excluded due
to missing information on the type of appeal. Of the 8,283 usable appeals,
138 involved an appeal by the government and were excluded from many (but
not all) of the analyses. These exclusions generated a final usable sample of
8,145 federal criminal appeals.8
As helpful as the data might be, important limitations reduce their
generalizability. Questions about how to interpret results endure. For
example, at a basic level it is not entirely clear what data on federal criminal
trial appeal outcomes mean or stand for. As Professor Shavell notes, the
selection effects and case stream filtering that take place before the criminal
appeals process even begins supply critical context necessary to inform
criminal appellate outcomes.9 Criminal appellate outcomes are a function of
those criminal cases that pursue an appeal to its outcome. Factors that
influence the stream of criminal cases that pursue an appeal to its outcome
include prosecutors exercising discretion over which criminal cases to pursue,
pretrial plea bargaining, and posttrial (and pre-appeal) settlement activity.
Although such nuanced influences as the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion are notoriously difficult to assess with empirical rigor, theory (and
conventional wisdom) provides helpful direction. Selection effects and case
stream filtering work in a manner that most often reduces the number of
7. Fiscal Year 2006 runs from October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2006, inclusive.
8. U.S. SENT‘G COMM ‘N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 141–43
tbl.56
n.1
(2006)
[hereinafter
U.S.S.C.,
2006
SOURCEBOOK],
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006table56.pdf.
9. See Shavell, supra note 1, at 414–15.
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criminal appeals likely to be reversed. 10 Moreover, the criminal justice
system‘s structural tilt favoring the accused—the ―beyond a reasonable
doubt‖ standard of proof imposed for conviction and the general prohibition
on governmental appeal of acquittals—individually and collectively skew the
sub-pool of criminal convictions that stimulate an appeal. As a result, the
residual pool of criminal appeals likely systematically differs from the larger
universe of criminal trial outcomes. If so, the influence of these factors
complicates efforts to interpret criminal appellate results, including raw
criminal appellate reversal rates.
III. DISCUSSION
Important limitations notwithstanding, the data provide for a rough outline
of the federal criminal appeals terrain. The descriptive findings focus on the
type of appeal, disposition, variation across circuits, as well as the influence
of a relatively recent key U.S. Supreme Court decision, United States v.
Booker.11 Moreover, prior work on civil appellate outcomes provides a useful
(albeit imperfect) reference point against which one can assess criminal
appellate outcomes. Before turning to the results of the analyses, however,
this Article briefly considers why appeals in general, and criminal appeals in
particular, warrant more scholarly attention.
A. Why Worry About Appeals?
Despite their comparative scarcity, appealed cases—far more than cases
that settle or go to trial—form the basis of much of what many observers
know about the legal system. For much of the public, aside from those with
first-hand experience with and knowledge of the legal system, perceptions
about the law flow from some level of familiarity with appellate decisions,
especially Supreme Court decisions. Far too few citizens fully grasp that
institutions other than appellate courts handle the overwhelming majority of
the legal ―work.‖
What is generally true for much of the public is also true—though to a
lesser extent—for informed observers and for many legal scholars. Appellate
decisions dominate law school casebooks and contribute to legal doctrine and
to precedent that binds trial courts. Much of the work of scholars who focus
on how our legal system actually works relies on published court decisions.
In addition, appellate court decisions are far more accessible in the major
searchable legal databases (such as Westlaw and Lexis). This further tilts
legal research toward appellate courts and appellate decisions and away from
the far larger mass of unappealled trial court decisions.

10. Id.
11. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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What is true at the general level—appealed cases‘ disproportionate
influence—is perhaps even truer in the federal criminal context. Structural
differences and the generally higher stakes render criminal law, especially
federal criminal law, more influential in the eyes of many. Criminal law
violations are, by definition, construed as violations against the state.
Although civil matters can (and periodically do) involve the spectacular, as
between civil and criminal the latter tends to dominate the public psyche. The
media and popular culture‘s periodic preoccupation with law typically
preferences criminal over civil matters. Indeed, the media routinely describes
and displays crimes. Criminal—far more than civil—law litters the popular
culture landscape, ―from television, to movies, to books.‖12
In addition, the scope and stakes of American criminal law continue to
stagger. As the economy and population have grown over two centuries, the
United States has achieved the largest prison population in human history,
with the highest imprisonment rate in the industrialized world. 13 ―In the
process, the empire of criminal justice in the United States has become as
broad in its reach as it has been exceedingly harsh in its effects.‖14 In many
instances, including capital crimes, the stakes involved in criminal law could
not be any higher. Finally, although criminal law remains principally the
province of the states, federal criminal law has increased both in relative and
absolute terms over time. 15
Within the appellate context, the sheer increase of federal criminal appeals
over time contributes to criminal law‘s influence in the appeals process. As
Professor Galanter notes, the federal criminal caseload (measured in terms of
raw number of defendants) increased between 1962 and 2002, if modestly
(compared to the civil caseload) and unevenly. 16 In 1955, fewer than 5,000
appeals were filed in federal courts of appeals. Fifty years later, in 2004, the
number of filings exceeded 61,000.17 Thus, at the same time the raw number
12. Steven Friedland, Teaching Property Law: Some Lessons Learned, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
581, 590 (2002); see id. at 590 n.38 (remarking that criminal law penetrates popular culture far
deeper than property law).
13. See, e.g., James Vicini, Number of U.S. Prisoners Has Biggest Rise in 6 Years, Reuters
(June 27, 2007), www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN2637053120070627 (noting that the
prison population in the United States is approximately 2.2 million, in China it is 1.5 million, and in
Russia it is 900,000).
14. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Criminal Justice, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 941, 942 (2008).
15. See, e.g., Michael E. Horowitz & April Oliver, Foreword: The State of Federal
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1033, 1039–40 (2006) (―[F]ederal courts have been overrun with
criminal cases.‖).
16. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 492, 493 fig.23 (2004).
17. See Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts Over the
Last Half Century, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 133, 137 tbl.3 (2006).
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of federal appeals increased, the proportion of criminal cases that blossomed
into appeals also grew. This interaction helps place federal criminal appeals
on the center stage of legal research.
B. Types of Federal Criminal Appeals and Their Disposition
The U.S. Sentencing Commission gathers data on federal appeals of
criminal sentences, as well as appeals of sentences and convictions. Table 1
illustrates that as between these two broad types of criminal appeals, more
than twice as many appeals involve only a criminal sentence rather than a
sentence and conviction (71.4% vs. 28.6%).
Table 1 also makes clear that most criminal appeals, regardless of type,
are affirmed. This finding comports with what conventional wisdom would
predict. Because pursuing a criminal appeal is essentially free—or, more
accurately, because criminal appellants are not forced to internalize the full
costs of their appeal—there is little incentive not to appeal. Consequently,
many commentators characterize a large percentage of criminal appeals as
meritless, if not frivolous.18 As a consequence, a high affirmance rate is
expected.
Table 1: 2006 Federal Criminal Appeals Disposition by Type (%)19
All
Appeals
68.5
11.7

Sentence
Only
71.6
10.2

Sentence &
Conviction
60.8
15.2

Affirmed
Reversed
Affirmed and
2.8
2.2
4.0
Reversed in Part
Remanded
9.3
8.2
12.1
Dismissed
7.8
7.8
7.7
Total Appeals
8,145
5,817
2,328
A distinct, though related, question involves assessing whether the federal
criminal appeals affirmance rate is low or high. Such an assessment,
however, requires context that is, unfortunately, not readily available.
Drawing on various disparate sources suggests that the affirmance rate found
for federal criminal appeals in 2006 (68.5%) is roughly comparable to
18. See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); John T. Wold,
Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court Decisionmaking, 62 JUDICATURE 58,
61 (1978) (describing the ―right of indigents to a ‗free‘ appeal‖ as ―result[ing] in a caseload . . . of
‗routine,‘ nonmeritorious appeals‖).
19. U.S.S.C., 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 141–43 tbl.56. See also United States
Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Convictions and Sentences: Appeals Data,
2006 (ICPSR 20101) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. 2006], http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/
STUDY/20101.xml, which was the source of data used in this table and in Tables 4–6, infra.
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affirmance rates from state criminal appeals as well as prior federal appeals.
In a study of five state criminal appeals courts in the late 1980s, Chapper and
Hanson found affirmance rates that ranged from 70.8% (Rhode Island) to
81.7% (Maryland).20 In addition, Table 2 illustrates that the affirmance rate in
2006 is comparable to past years (with the notable exception of 2005).
Table 2: Percentage of Federal Criminal Appeals Affirmed, by Year 21

90
80
70
60
50

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

40

Civil appeals rates supply another point of reference. Comparisons with
results from civil appeals, presented in Table 3, raise important
methodological problems, however. Structural differences between the civil
and the criminal contexts impede ready comparisons of appeals results.
Differences in standing to appeal are among the important structural
differences. In the civil context, either party has the ability to appeal. In the
criminal context, however, constitutional double jeopardy protections for
criminal defendants generally afford defendants only with the opportunity to
appeal an adverse trial judgment.22 As a result, even if one were inclined to
compare criminal and civil appeal outcome rates, it is not entirely clear
whether the appropriate rate is that which involves only defendants who
appeal adverse trial court decisions or, instead, the overall civil appeal
20. See JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT‘L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS 35 tbl.3 (1989).
21. See U.S. Sentencing Commission‘s SOURCEBOOKS from 1995 through 2007, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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outcome rate. Owing to an asymmetric distribution of appeal outcomes for
plaintiffs and defendants in the civil context, 23 the decision about the proper
reference group is important. In addition, differences in applicable standards
of proof that separate civil and criminal trials may also influence comparisons
of appeal rates.
Despite important difficulties in comparing criminal and civil reversal
rates, general impressions arise without too much difficulty. The overall
criminal reversal rate (11.7%) is lower than the overall civil reversal rates,
state or federal (32.1% and 18.4%, respectively). 24 Moreover, if civil appeals
by defendants are more comparable to federal criminal appeals, the
discrepancy is even starker. Defendants in civil litigation are far more likely
to prevail on appeal than defendants seeking to reverse a sentence or
conviction (or both).25
1. What to Make of the Comparatively Low Criminal Appeal Reversal Rate?
Many instinctively seek comfort from the comparably low criminal
reversal rates. After all, comparatively low criminal reversal rates plausibly
imply that criminal trial courts are ―getting it right‖ in an overwhelming
percentage of cases. Given the stakes for criminal defendants, this public
impulse is understandable.
On the other hand, however, the comparably low reversal rate might be an
artifact of a highly skewed subset of convicted criminal defendants who
pursue an appeal. That is, given the assuredly skewed stream of convicted
criminal defendants who that pursue an appeal, perhaps the observed level of
reversal rates is low. Simply put, and similar to civil context, the
overwhelming bulk of ―activity‖ in our criminal justice system takes place
outside of trials. Plea bargaining resolves the ―vast majority‖ of federal
criminal cases, and plea bargains are rarely reviewed for error.26 Moreover, a
growing array of criminal procedural doctrines has expanded, with the
cumulative effect of precluding appellate relief even when the appellate court
finds trial court error.27 Without a firm understanding of how the criminal
23. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 124 (2009) (discussing asymmetrical
distribution in state civil appeals); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the
Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV .
947 (2002) (examining statistics on federal civil appeals).
24. See Table 3 infra.
25. See Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 23, at 144–48 (assessing why civil appeals courts tend
to favor defendants).
26. Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right of
Appeal, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 943, 978 (2002).
27. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2055
n.91 (2000) (noting the impact of forgiving trial court errors through the harmless error doctrine).

832

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:825

cases that proceed to trial might systematically differ from the vast bulk of
cases resolved through a plea bargain, criminal reversal rate findings tell us
precious little.
Further, instances in which the trial court clearly ―got it wrong‖ and
wrongfully convicted factually innocent individuals profoundly challenge
public confidence in the assumption that criminal trials courts are ―getting it
right‖—certainly not always. No context is more visceral in this regard than
the exoneration of death row inmates on the basis of DNA evidence. Recent
successes by the Innocence Project remind us all of the appellate court‘s most
salient mission—error reversal. The public‘s tolerance for error, however,
continues to grow thin, so much so that wrongful convictions of death row
inmates—admittedly a stunningly rare event—nonetheless contribute to an
erosion of public support for the death penalty. 28
Table 3: State and Federal Civil Trials, Reversal Rates (%)29

All Trials
Jury Trials
Judge Trials
Appealing
Party
Defendant
Plaintiff
Total
Reversals

State

Federal

32.1
33.7
27.5

18.4
20.4
16.5

41.5
21.5

32.5
12.0

176

1,355

C. Geographic Variation
National snapshots of our legal system—in particular, our federal
appellate criminal justice system—often mask important variation across
circuits. Indeed, geography often influences an array of outcomes in the legal
system, including appeal outcome, 30 damages, 31 and disposition time. 32
28. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and Prison
Conditions, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 719, 741 (2002) (―[P]ublic support for the death penalty has recently
declined somewhat after revelations about the actual innocence of dozens of people wrongly sent to
death row. . . .‖).
29. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 23, at 130 tbl.1.
30. See, e.g., id., supra note 23, at 140.
31. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
623, 630–32 (1997) (discussing the salience of geography to punitive damages).

2009]

EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL APPEALS

833

Results in Table 4 comport with these other results that found geographic
variation. Although the overall average nationwide affirmance rate for 2006
criminal appeals was 68.5%, across the nation‘s twelve federal circuits
affirmance rates ranged from a low of 49.3% (D.C. Circuit) to a high of
85.1% (Eleventh Circuit). Reversal rates ranged from 5.7% to 20.5%.
Remand and dismissal rates displayed even greater variation; remand rates
ranged from 2.3% to 22.1%, and dismissal rates varied from 0.5% to 27.8%.
Of course, to some degree the influence of geography may mask the effect
of varied case types. That is, available data do not permit more finely
granulated analyses for criminal case types and the selection effects
challenges they might impose. This is important insofar as the prosecution of
some crimes (particularly complex crimes) might lend themselves more to
reversible error than other types of crimes. The influence of crime types may
distort the influence of geography if we assume that appeals of various crime
types do not distribute randomly across the federal circuits. Such an
assumption—that crime types do not distribute randomly across circuits—is
borne out in other research. 33 Thus, while the results in Table 4 provide a
helpful starting point, once again more probative results require data that are
not readily available.

32. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 836–38 (2000) (discussing the influence of geography on state
civil case disposition time).
33. See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477,
553–54 (2002) (finding criminal case type variation across federal districts).
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Table 4: 2006 Criminal Sentencing Appeals Disposition by Circuit (%)34

National
Average
Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Total
Dispositions

Affirmed

Reversed

Affirmed &
Reversed

Remanded

Dismissed

68.5

11.7

2.8

9.3

7.8

73.5
64.6
63.0
71.8
74.2
62.6
59.1
83.7
53.6
58.2
85.1
49.3

13.2
12.4
20.1
13.2
12.5
20.5
12.7
5.7
9.7
6.6
8.2
11.6

7.3
5.8
1.7
2.0
1.5
3.5
1.8
2.1
4.0
1.8
3.9
1.4

4.7
16.8
10.7
4.6
7.7
8.7
6.5
5.0
22.1
5.6
2.3
31.9

1.3
0.7
5.7
8.5
4.1
4.6
19.9
3.6
10.6
27.8
0.5
5.8

5,579

955

224

756

631

D. Booker’s Influence
The Supreme Court‘s United States v. Booker35 decision dealt the world of
federal criminal sentencing a profound shock. The United States Sentencing
Commission,36 created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,37 established a
sentencing ―grid‖ (Guidelines) whereby the sentencing range for a defendant
was determined as a function of, among other variables, the seriousness of the
crime and the defendant‘s criminal history (if any). 38 The Guidelines went
into effect on November 1, 1987, and applied immediately to most federal
crimes committed after that date and until the Booker decision in 2005. As it
relates to American federal criminal law, contemporaneous observers
described the Guidelines as the ―most dramatic change in our Nation‘s
34. U.S.S.C., 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 141–43 tbl.56. The disposition percentages
and totals listed are based on a total number of 8,145 appeals.
35. 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 2005).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
37. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Title II of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2034 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C and 28 U.S.C.).
38. For a fuller description, see Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss,
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1377, 1397 n.72 (1998).
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history.‖39
What makes Booker critical is that it unwound the Guidelines‘ ―most
dramatic change‖ to criminal sentencing. Specifically, Booker rendered the
U.S. Sentencing Commission‘s Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory
and their application subject to review for reasonableness. In determining an
appropriate sentence, a district judge must initially calculate the sentence
range recommended by the Guidelines. A court must then assess whether a
sentence within the range proposed by the Guidelines is consistent with the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).40 Criminal sentences that fall within
the range recommended by the Guidelines benefit from a presumption of
reasonableness. Now that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, however, a
sentencing judge may rely on facts other than those found by the jury or
specifically admitted by the defendant when calculating a sentence. 41
Subsequent decisions confirm the judiciary‘s recapture of sentencing
discretion.42
Not surprisingly, the Booker decision signaled a ―transitional moment,‖ 43
one that predictably and profoundly influenced criminals and federal criminal
sentencing. One expected outcome includes an increased reversal rate for
criminal appeals from defendants sentenced under the pre-Booker regime.
Another expected outcome is that appeals that cite to Booker would be more
likely to generate a reversal. The data provide support for both expected
outcomes.
Table 2 makes clear that the federal appellate courts took Booker‘s
admonition seriously, as the decision correlates with an abrupt and palpable
reduction in the criminal appeals affirmance rate. From 1995 through 2004,
the affirmance rate hovered at approximately 80%. In 2005, the year Booker
was decided, the affirmance rate suddenly dropped to just over 54.9%. One
year later, while courts continued to work through a backlog of Bookerinspired appeals, the affirmance rate increased to 68.5%. By 2007, the final
year of available data, the affirmance rate climbed back to 80%, or the preBooker level. Whether the criminal appeals affirmance rate has now fully
digested the shock imposed by Booker and reestablished its equilibrium is not
yet clear.
The results in Table 2, while helpful, provide only a timeline. Although
the palpable drop in affirmances in 2005 obviously correlates with the Booker

39. See 133 CONG. REC. 26,367 (1987) (remarks of Rep. Conyers).
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
41. See United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 665 (6th Cir. 2007).
42. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
43. See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J.
922, 939 (2006).
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decision, the nature of the relation is not fully understood. A similar, though
distinct, question involves the degree to which appeals that cite to Booker
correlate with an appellate court reversal. To illustrate Booker‘s influence on
2006 appeals, Table 5 presents results from a re-analysis of Table 1 and
breaks out appeals that cited to Booker from those that did not. At the
descriptive level, results in Table 5 clearly suggest that citation to Booker
influenced an appeal‘s outcome. Notably, the overall reversal rate for appeals
that cited to Booker is twice that of appeals that did not (14.6% versus 6.7%).
Also, appeals that cited to Booker experienced almost half as many dismissals
(5.8% versus 11%) and more than five times as many remands (13.2% versus
2.6%).
Obviously, it was not appellate courts‘ mere citation to Booker that
accounted for the different outcomes. More likely is that an appeal that cited
to Booker involved issues germane to Booker, and, therefore, the Supreme
Court‘s 2005 decision made these issues less legally stable. Regardless of
what an appeal‘s citation to Booker might signal, Table 5 makes clear that
these two substreams of appeals differ in terms of appeals dispositions.
Table 5: Influence of Booker Citation for 2006 Criminal Appeals
Disposition by Type (%)44

Booker cited in appeal
Affirmed
Reversed
Affirmed & Reversed in Part
Remanded
Dismissed
Total Appeals
Booker not cited in appeal
Affirmed
Reversed
Affirmed & Reversed in Part
Remanded
Dismissed
Total Appeals

All
Appeals

Sentence
Only

Sentence &
Conviction

63.1
14.6
3.3
13.2
5.8
5,150

67.7
12.5
2.6
11.4
5.9
3,672

51.8
20.0
4.9
17.5
5.7
1,478

77.7
6.7
1.9
2.6
11.0
2,995

78.3
6.5
1.7
2.7
10.9
2,145

76.4
7.3
2.5
2.6
11.3
850

Further and closer analysis of a comparison of a key outcome—

44. U.S.S.C. 2006, supra note 19.
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reversals45—that involved citations to Booker, and those reversals that did not,
uncovers important differences between the two groups. Because Booker
dealt with the Guidelines, the analysis in Table 6 only includes appeals
involving a defendant‘s sentence. As Table 6 illustrates, appellate reversals
systematically distribute unevenly between sentencing-related appeals that
cited to Booker and those that did not.
Table 6: Booker Citations’ Influence on 2006 Criminal Appeals Outcomes
(Sentence Only)46
Trial Court
Decision
Affirmed

Trial Court
Decision
Reversed

3,214
2,006

458
139

5,220

597

Booker Cited?
Yes
No
Total Outcomes

The ―deep split‖ in how federal circuit courts dealt with Booker ―pipeline‖
cases contributed to the abrupt dislocation in appeals outcomes pre- and postBooker.47 As Professor Heytens notes, some federal appellate courts imposed
upon defendants pushing Booker claims on appeal the full burden of
satisfying the usual requirements for a remand for resentencing.48 Other
federal circuits, by contrast, simply remanded every pre-Booker case in which
the defendant so requested.49 Finally, other circuits carved a middle ground
by requiring trial judges to publicly disclose whether they would have
imposed the same sentence had they known the Guidelines were voluntary. 50
Remands would arise only in appeals where trial court judges acknowledged
that they might have (or, in fact, had) imposed a different sentence.
IV. INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES
Although the results presented above convey some helpful general
45. In this analysis the term ―reversal‖ includes cases that were reversed and vacated as well as
reversed and remanded.
46. U.S.S.C. 2006, supra note 19. Pearson chi-square = 52.80; p < 0.001.
47. Heytens, supra note 43, at 951–52.
48. Id. at 951. See Brief for the United States at 11 & n.3, 12 n.4, Rodriguez v. United States,
545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (No. 04-1148) (describing decisions from the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits).
49. Brief for the United States, supra note 48, at 15–16 (describing decisions from the Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
50. Id. at 13–15 (describing decisions from the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits).
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information about the federal criminal appellate terrain, they convey quite
little due to data limitations as well as concerns about selection effects. As a
consequence, what we do not know about federal criminal appeals dwarfs
what we do know.
A. Criminal Appeals Data Limitations
To be sure, the U.S. Sentencing Commission does an admirable job
gathering and disseminating the leading source of annual federal criminal
appellate data. These data support descriptive work assessing criminal
appeals over time. Existing data are insufficient, however, to supply the
necessary context through which the descriptive appellate results can be more
meaningfully assessed.
It is, of course, far easier to envision the perfect federal criminal appeals
data set than it is to actually put it together. In an ideal world, researchers
would benefit from a user-friendly data set, organized at the individual
criminal ―event‖ level, which would include the entire universe of events from
which the pool of crimes emerges. Along with the standard and complete set
of background and control variables, such a data set would track the complete
disposition of each incident from beginning to end. This idealized data set
would permit researchers to observe how the complete universe of criminal
events winnows over time as it progresses through the criminal justice system,
with the precious few culminating in an appellate decision.
Idealized perfection, of course, is neither a useful nor helpful frame of
reference by which to judge the quality of existing data sets. The leading data
set for research on federal criminal appeals, produced by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, focuses on the final stage of the appellate process—the
outcomes of those appealed cases. Obviously, this is an important stage and
the data permit some analyses of the distribution of criminal appellate
outcomes. To better account for one important (potential) influence on
criminal appeals outcomes, the data need to derive from the universe of
criminal trials from which the appeals emerged. Once criminal appeals are
linked to their trials (by docket number, for example), researchers will be far
better prepared to assess whether and, if so, to what degree and how the pool
of criminal appeals systematically differs from the larger pool of criminal
trials. Knowing more about the larger pool from which criminal appeals
emerge—and whether appellate results systematically differ—would provide
critical context through which to assess the distribution of appellate outcomes.
Obviously, criminal trial data are subject to similar filtering effects (e.g.,
plea bargaining, prosecutorial discretion, and law enforcement selectivity).
Although the influences of such filtering on criminal appeals cannot be easily
dismissed, the practical difficulties associated with gathering data that bear on
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such filtering are profound. While similarly difficult and potentially
expensive, civil trial data, by contrast, are far more readily available. Indeed,
an analogous data set already exists in the state civil context. 51
B. Selection Effects
A seminal work by Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein 52 has
contributed to (indeed, helped frame) the formation of a theory about the
selection of cases for trial and the rates of success parties enjoy for cases that
are resolved by a formal trial. The theory, at its most basic level, includes two
distinct and severable parts. First, the sub-pool of cases resolved by formal
trial systematically differs from the larger universe of legal disputes from
which they emerge.53 The cases that persist to resolution by a trial involve
―close‖ facts or ―unclear‖ legal rules that are ―difficult‖ to apply. That is to
say, the cases that persist to trial for resolution are those for which the
outcomes are not easily predicted with accuracy. A second distinct
component of the Priest–Klein hypothesis flows from the first—that the
resolution of cases that persist to trial will result in 50% victories for the
plaintiff and 50% victories for the defendant.54
To note that the Priest–Klein hypotheses stimulated research, especially
empirical research, is to note only the obvious. However, results from much
of the subsequent work testing the ―50%‖ hypothesis are, in the main,
inconclusive. 55
Scholars have noted the tremendous variation that
occasionally appears in plaintiff success rates across districts and case types. 56
To the extent that the Priest–Klein 50% hypothesis has not weathered
subsequent testing well, 57 few dispute the important contribution from the first
part of the Priest–Klein hypothesis—in particular, that selection effects
account for important differences in the sub-pool of cases that persist to a
resolution by trial (let alone persisting through an appeal) and the larger
universe of legal disputes from which they derive.
Priest and Klein formulated their theories within the context of civil
litigation. Although the criminal and civil justice systems in the United States
51. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 23, at 127–29.
52. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
53. Id. at 13–17.
54. Id. at 17–20.
55. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 347 (1990).
56. Id. at 355–56.
57. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for
Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 315 (1988)
(discussing sample selectivity bias in the Priest–Klein model); Elder, supra note 2, at 192
(characterizing the Priest–Klein 50% hypothesis as ―incorrect‖).
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share many core elements, the two systems fundamentally differ in two
critical respects. First, for criminal prosecutions the government must prove
its case ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖58 and, second, the government is largely
precluded from appealing acquittals.59 For the narrow purpose of this Article,
the most important aspect is that ―[Priest and Klein‘s] basic insight . . . carries
over from the civil cases they study to criminal cases.‖60 While the selection
effects hypothesis straddles civil and criminal cases, differences in the two
systems implicate selection effects‘ influences. In particular, as Professor
Stith noted, structural differences between the civil and criminal justice
systems, particularly the preclusion of the government from appealing
criminal acquittals, generate important asymmetries unique to the criminal
context which, in turn, implicate criminal reversal rates.61
1. Selection Effects in the Criminal Context
Throughout the criminal justice process, a number of factors likely act as
filters that lead to a non-random sample of cases that generate an appellate
court decision. Among the factors that are the most difficult to measure are
the individual acts of discretion exerted by various law enforcement officials
and prosecutors throughout the four major stages of the criminal case—the
decision to prosecute, settlement negotiations (plea bargains), the
determination of guilt, and sentencing. Indeed, in the criminal justice system,
many factors and institutions, by constitutional design, influence the stream of
criminal appeals. The structural design features that distinguish the civil and
criminal systems and implicate selection effects include the standard of proof
required for a conviction and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The influence of
various selection effects may distort not only the pool of cases that pursue a
criminal appeal but also an appeal‘s outcome. If so, selection effects
complicate efforts to interpret criminal appellate reversal rates.
Setting aside law enforcement officials‘ discretion that influences the pool
of those detained or arrested,62 further filtering begins anew when prosecutors
assess whether to formally seek an indictment and, if so, for what charges.
Moreover, even in cases where prosecutors successfully secure indictments,
58. The Due Process Clause requires this burden of proof. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970).
59. The Constitution‘s prohibition on double jeopardy mandates this rule. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–97 (1969); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 126 (1904).
60. See Elder, supra note 2, at 192.
61. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
62. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 906–15 (1962) (describing how the exercise of police discretion in
the arrest function fuels accusations that police ―are harder on‖ black suspects than white suspects).
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the overwhelming majority of cases are resolved before trial through plea
bargaining. Most observers, such as Shavell, argue that such filtering likely
removes cases where the likelihood of a reversal is comparatively higher. 63
Additional filters influence criminal cases that are brought to trial. To
secure a criminal conviction, the government must prove its case beyond all
reasonable doubt.64 This threshold is considerably more severe than the
―preponderance‖ threshold in the civil setting. 65 Consequently, by definition
criminal appeals by defendants who lost at trial involve cases where a trial
court jury previously concluded that the facts proved the defendant‘s guilt
beyond all reasonable doubt. Any cases where the facts are not judged to
achieve this searching threshold do not even make it into the pool of potential
criminal appeals.
Constitutional design and federal statutes designate who can launch an
appeal in the federal criminal context and, in so doing, further influence the
stream of criminal appeals. The Constitution‘s Double Jeopardy Clause has
been interpreted to largely preclude governmental appeals of not guilty
verdicts. 66 What this means in practice is that, while a defendant can appeal a
conviction, the government cannot appeal an acquittal, despite what
prosecutors might think about trial court legal or factual errors. As Professor
Stith has observed, this pro-defendant procedural ―tilt‖ injects asymmetry into
the flow of criminal cases that proceed into the pool of potential criminal
appeals.67
In addition, to the extent that trial judges are mindful of appellate review
and seek to minimize reversals of their decisions, because criminal trial judges
can be reversed only for their decisions against the defendant, trial judges
might be incented to give defendants the benefit of the doubt in their rulings. 68
Regardless of trial judges‘ incentives, the filters in place governing the pool of
criminal appeals inform ex ante expectations about criminal appeals reversal
rates.
All of these factors—beginning with discretion exercised by law
63. Shavell, supra note 1, at 414.
64. It is commonly understood that the Due Process Clause mandates this standard. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
65. See Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for
Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1119 (1987) (noting the ―preponderance‖ rule is
the ―usual standard in civil litigation‖).
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–97 (1969).
67. See Stith, supra note 61, at 19. Although Professor Stith goes on to consider whether
selection effects exert a pro-defendant bias in the evolution of legal standards over time, id. at 50, my
more modest goal is to consider only the distribution of appellate court outcomes.
68. See R. Erik Lillquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2003).
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enforcement and prosecutors and continuing through the settlement, trial, and
appellate stages—serve as filters that influence which cases enter the criminal
justice system, how cases proceed through the system, and what appellate
outcomes result. To the extent that such factors exert selection effects, these
effects influence the distribution of appellate outcomes. Consequently, a
textured and nuanced understanding of these admittedly complex selection
effects is necessary to fully understand the distribution of criminal appellate
outcomes and what it means. Although helpful data exist that illustrate the
distribution of criminal appeals and how the distribution changes over time,
existing data are insufficient to confidently assess the influences of plausible
selection effects. The paucity of data germane to studying selection effects
limits the analytic weight that data on criminal appellate outcomes can carry.
V. CONCLUSION
Although pleas for ―more [and better] data‖ are quite common, 69
especially among legal empiricists, 70 such pleas are especially apt in the
criminal appeals context. What remains unknown about federal criminal
appeals far outweighs what is known. Moreover, what is known lacks the
texture and nuance necessary to put results into proper context. Still, the
broad contours of existing data on the distribution of federal criminal
appellate outcomes, while far short of thorough and definitive, provide some
helpful guidelines and trends. What these guidelines and trends mean,
however, and what one can properly infer from them, is far less clear.
Contributing to the questions‘ complications and illusiveness are severe
limitations of existing data as well as the influence of selection effects. Thus,
while existing data sketch out the general contours of what our federal
appellate courts are doing in the criminal setting, how to interpret these data
remains far from clear.
This lack of clarity flows more from limited data than limited theory.
Existing data limitations all but preclude assessments of selection effects that
the structure of the federal criminal justice system almost guarantees exist.
Throughout the stream of federal criminal cases—from the criminal incident
itself, to the discretion exercised by law enforcement and prosecutors, and the
further filtering influences of plea bargaining and the criminal trial—
important factors shape the astonishingly small pool of criminal cases that
initiate the appellate process. Because both theory and reality suggest that the
sub-universe of criminal appeals systematically differs from the universe of
69. See, e.g., Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: TwoHeaded Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 54 (―Like all such studies this
one has ended with a plea for more study: more data, larger samples, better control groups.‖).
70. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 824
(1999) (noting the need for the greater development of germane data sets for legal scholars).
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criminal cases from which appeals derive, what to make of the distribution of
appellate outcomes is not immediately apparent. To be sure, while more and
better data may not provide conclusive answers to important questions
regarding the world of federal criminal appeals, more and better data will
certainly contribute to and develop our understanding of federal criminal
appeals.

